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Abstract:  Cholera and other diarrheal diseases are the second leading cause of death 
among the poor globally. The tragedy of this statistic is that it need not be the case.  
Unlike many afflictions, the impact of cholera can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, 
through the collective action of clean water services.  This begs the question of why such 
collective action is absent in much of the world.  To address this, we first develop a 
theoretical model which indicates that the required collective action is an increasing 
function of both a country’s level of income and income equality.  We test these 
predictions by analyzing 1,032 annual observations arising from 17 relatively poor 
countries between the years 1980 and 2002.  The countries come from the Americas, 
Africa, and Asia.  In the first part of the analysis, we find that the collective action of 
providing clean water is, as predicted, an increasing function of income and equality.  
Following this, we find that both the numbers of cases and deaths resulting from a given 
cholera outbreak are strongly and negatively related to the collective action.   
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1. Introduction 
The period of the 1960’s and 1970’s offers two tragically different views of cholera (and 
other infectious diseases, for that matter).  On the one hand, serious, well-intentioned 
health care professionals were suggesting that the fight against infectious disease was 
nearing its conclusion.  Consider, for example, the Surgeon General of the United States’ 
pronouncement in 1970 that it was “time to close the book on infectious diseases, and 
shift national resources to such chronic problems as cancer and heart disease” (WHO, 
2000, p. 1).  A similar degree of optimism was expressed globally in 1978 when the 
United Nations adopted its “Health to All” accord which predicted that, by the turn of the 
century, even in the poorest countries, infectious diseases would no longer pose a serious 
health threat to humans (WHO, 2000, p. 7).  Unfortunately, such optimism failed the test 
of reality since even though truly remarkable medical advances in all areas of protection 
from and treatment for such illnesses was advancing at very promising rates, while 
perhaps down, illnesses like cholera were far from out.  In fact, as early as 1961, the 
seventh known pandemic of cholera since the middle 1800’s had begun in South East 
Asia where it is endemic (Nations and Monte, p. 1007).  And, given its nature, cholera is 
no respecter of peoples or societies.  In fact, between 1848 and 1854 alone, cholera 
resulted in the deaths of a quarter of a million, primarily poor, people in Great Britain 
alone who regularly had little choice but to make use of water tainted with human and 
animal wastes in their daily lives. 
  Cholera is an ancient bacterial disease which predominantly spreads through 
contact with tainted water.  As such, the poor, especially those who rely on local rivers 
and streams or inadequately constructed and protected wells for their drinking water and   2
who have only the most rudimentary sanitation arrangements are most susceptible to its 
potentially live-threatening bouts of diarrhea and vomiting which in extreme cases can 
lead to the loss of upwards of a person’s entire body weight in fluids within a matter of a 
couple of days (Nations and Monte, p. 1008).  Of course, tainted water tends not to 
remain in one location leading to the spread of the early 1960’s outbreak of cholera in 
Asia first to Europe and then to Africa, where it became truly endemic.  Spared initially 
was the Western Hemisphere which had not witnessed a significant cholera outbreak for 
a century.  This changed when, in 1991, Vibrio cholera O1, biotype El Tor and serotype 
Inaba (simply cholera henceforth) was detected in two coastal Peruvian cities (Lima and 
Guerrant, 1994, pps. 1-5).  With nearly one-half million cases and some 3,300 deaths, 
Peru was shown no mercy by this ancient disease.  Next to suffer its wrath was Brazil 
where, by 1993, 70 percent of that country’s states reported confirmed cases.  Given that 
cholera thrives with poverty and the limited access to clean water and squalid living 
conditions that typically accompany that living status, the hardest hit parts of Brazil were 
in that country’s extremely impoverished Northeastern cities and states which reported 87 
percent of the total Brazilian cases and a probability of death once contracting the illness 
that was three times the national average (Lima 1994, p. 593).  And, far from being 
brought under control, this current pandemic of cholera shows little sign of slowing. 
As is unanimously agreed upon by health care professionals, however, the 
primary remedy for cholera (and all diarrheal diseases for that matter) is almost too 
simple to point out:  the provision of safe drinking water.  Yet in 1990, more than a 
billion people worldwide depended on rivers, streams, ponds or other unsafe surface 
sources for drinking water (Mintz et al., 1995), where direct sewage contamination is   3
often present.
1  Similar (and sometimes greater) risks can be involved with the modest 
wastewater treatment processes often found in poorer areas and countries.
2  When soil is 
part of wastewater treatment, microorganisms remain in the treatment area until they 
naturally die off, which, depending on characteristics of soil, such as its moisture content, 
can take a remarkably long period of time (Lane and Weaver, 1999, p. 42).  And when 
soil is excessively saturated, many microorganisms are capable of migrating rather long 
distances, transport which is often aided by water flowing out of local sewers.  Thus, 
when a significant portion of a population consumes unsafe surface and ground water, 
even the presence of a sewage system may provide only limited protection since very 
minor leaks from the sewer system can travel long distances and contaminate distant 
water sources.  In each case, the matter is made worse through flooding which can simply 
overwhelm the often under-sized or poorly constructed water-treatment systems found in 
many poor areas. 
Of course, regardless of the quality of water systems available to a population, 
human intervention often lies at the root of the spread of cholera.  Even if clean water is 
available, cholera can rather effectively spread if individuals practice poor personal 
and/or household hygiene habits suggesting that in addition to high-level water systems, 
public education programs as to the causes and mitigation of cholera play an essential 
role in limiting its spread. 
Adam Smith, upon listing ‘defense and protecting the individuals against 
                                                 
1 “[I]n El Alto, Bolivia ... all families obtain water from shallow wells (2-5 meters) that they dig in front of their homes.  
Most households store drinking water in buckets.  All families dispose of human waste on the open ground or in a 
nearby river.  Sewage and wastewater are openly disposed in many developing countries without any treatment” (Quick 
et al., 1999). 
 
2 In Africa, for instance, virtually no wastewater receives treatment before it is disposed.  In Latin America and the 
Caribbean region only 14% of wastewater is treated, while in Asia about 35% of wastewater is treated before it is 
discharged (IRC, 2001, p. 3).   4
violence’ and ‘protecting them from injustice and oppression’, mentions that the 
remaining most important duty of the state is “the duty of erecting and maintaining 
certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest 
of any individual, or a small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the 
profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, 
though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society” (Smith, 1999, p. 
134). 
Why then does a very significant portion of the world’s population still live with 
unsafe water systems?  The high cost of establishing and improving public water and 
sewer pipeline systems is often cited as a barrier to the necessary collective action.  It is 
estimated, for example, that a 50 percent reduction by 2015 in the proportion of people 
lacking safe drinking water and basic sanitation would cost $7 billion per year, which is 
30 percent more than is currently been spent on all such projects (IRC, 2001, p. 6).  And 
should global warming continue on its currently predicted path, such estimates of these 
costs will only increase as the world’s tropical and sub-tropical regions expand. 
Decision-making with respect to providing clean drinking water and proper 
sanitation, however, is not based on the benefits of such programs to the ones who need 
them the most, but rather, on a society’s ability to raise the necessary funds to provide the 
collective action.  The next section provides a theoretical explanation as to the 
circumstances in which a society can (and can not) come up with the resources for the 
provision of these services.
 3   
                                                 
3    See Anbarci, Escaleras and Register (2005) for a detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of a setup in the context 
of earthquake disaster hazards where in some environments different segments of society prove incapable of arriving at 
an equitable distribution of the tax burden of the necessary collective action, causing the relatively wealthy to simply 
self-insure against the potential disaster while leaving the relatively poor to its mercy. 
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The theoretical model has two important features.  The first is rather common: the 
notion that the collective action necessary to provide for access to clean water services is 
positively related to a society’s level of income.  The second and more interesting feature 
of the model is that investment in this collective action is positively related to the degree 
of income equality in society.   
Following this, we test the predictions of this model by analyzing 1,032 annual 
observations arising from 17 countries and 3 continents that reported at least one cholera 
outbreak during the period 1980-2002.  Given that cholera is effectively mitigated by 
access to clean water, we limit our sample to relatively poor countries, those with per 
capita GDP’s of less than $4,000, where rates of provision of clean water access tend to 
be relatively low.  In this way, we avoid the potentially misleading effects brought about 
by what might be thought of as ‘stray’ cases or even minor outbreaks of cholera 
occurring in a relatively wealthy country that is not truly part of the current pandemic.  
Such cases might result from relatively isolated instances of importation of tainted food 
crops or tourists whose illnesses have not yet progressed to the point which would raise 
immigration alarms as they enter a wealthy country.   
The empirical results confirm the theoretical model’s predictions that per capita 
income and income equality are key variables in determining both a country’s level of 
collective action (the provision of clean water) and in the extent and severity of outbreaks 
of cholera, when they occur.  Specifically, we show that the provision of improved water 
is an increasing function of the levels of income and income equality existing within an 
economy and, equally important, that such collective action significantly reduces both the 
incidents of and deaths resulting from cholera when an outbreak occurs. 
   6
2. Theoretical Model 
For simplicity, we assume that there are two goods: clean water and a private good that 
the parties’ incomes are spent on.  As discussed in the previous section, the more a 
society can afford to spend on provision of clean water and proper sanitation via 
collective action (i.e., via the collected taxes), the smaller is the extent and severity of any 
waterborne disease outbreak that might occur. 
  We assume for simplicity that there are two segments in society, the high-income 
segment (H) and the low-income segment (L).  The L segment’s pre-tax income level is 
normalized at 1, and the H segment’s pre-tax income level is a > 1; note that a denotes 
the degree of pre-tax income inequality between the two segments.  The government 
collects taxes from these segments to provide all types of infrastructure, among them, 
water services.  Given the pre-tax income levels of the two segments, consider the simple 
After-Tax Possibilities Frontier {(1,0),(0,a)}.  A tax system is proportional if each 
income group pays the same proportion of their income in taxes.  Given our simplistic 
after-tax possibilities frontier, a proportional tax, P, would lead to after tax incomes of 
yL
P = ½ and yL
P = a/2.  Then the Total Tax Revenue, TTR
P, would be (1+ a)/2.  A tax 
system is progressive if lower income groups pay a lower proportion of their income in 
taxes than higher income groups.  As an example, take a progressive tax system in which 
L-types pay 40 percent of their pre-tax income in taxes and H-types pay 60 percent of 
their pre-tax income in taxes.  Such a tax system would lead to yL
PR = .6 and yL
PR = 2a/5 
and a total tax revenue, TTR
PR, of (.4+ 3a/5).  Finally, a tax system is regressive if lower 
income groups pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than higher income 
groups.  As an example, assume a regressive tax system in which L-types pay 60 percent   7
of their pre-tax income in taxes and H-types pay 40 percent of their pre-tax income in 
taxes.  In this case, the tax system would lead to yL
R = .4 and yL
R = 3a/5 and total tax 
revenue, TTR
R, of (.6+ 2a/5). 
  Typically direct taxes (those levied on private individuals, corporations, and 
property) make up 20 to 40 percent of total tax revenue for most developing countries 
while indirect taxes (such as import and export duties and excise—purchase, sales and 
turnover—taxes) comprise 60 to 80 percent of total tax revenue (Todaro, 2000, p. 670).   
It is widely documented that indirect taxes tend to be rather regressive (see Todaro (2000) 
and Gemmell and Morrissey (2005) and references therein); that is, with indirect taxes 
lower income groups tend to pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than higher 
income groups.  While Theorem 1 flows from this notion of generally regressive taxes in 
relatively poor countries, it should be noted (and can be shown upon request), that the 
degree of regressivity needed to generate the result is extremely minor, that is, the 
following holds with tax regimes that approach proportionality. 
 
Theorem 1:   As inequality increases or per capita income decreases within a society 
with even a mildly regressive tax regime, the level of collective action in 
the form of provision of improved water can be expected to decrease as 
government revenues fall, which will lead to both increases in outbreaks 
and the severity of those outbreaks arising from any waterborne disease. 
 
Proof: We will first show that even a minor redistribution, δ > 0, in the pre-tax 
income distribution from L to H will decrease the total tax revenue the government   8
collects.  Suppose the regressive tax system is such that the after-tax incomes of L and H 
are yL
R = (½ -ε) and yL
R = a(½+ε), respectively, with pre-tax income levels of 1 and a, 
where ½ > ε  > 0.  Then the TTR
R will be ½(a+1)-ε(a-1).  Now consider pre-tax income 
levels 1-δ and a+δ.  With the same regressive tax system in place now the after-tax 
income of L and H will be yL
R = (1-δ)(½-ε) and yL
R = (a+δ)(½+ε), respectively.  Then the 
new TTR
R will be ½(a+1)-ε(a-1)-2εδ.  Thus, government revenues fall by 2εδ. 
Now consider a proportional decrease in pre-tax incomes, assuming no change in 
the degree of pre-tax income inequality.  That is, suppose each segment’s pre-tax income 
is multiplied by k < 1.  Then the after-tax incomes of L and H decrease from yL
R = (½ -ε) 
and yL
R = a(½+ε), respectively, to yL
R = k(½ -ε) and yL
R = ka(½+ε), respectively, and the 
TTR
R will decrease from ½(a+1)-ε(a-1) to k[½(a+1)-ε(a-1)].  Thus, the decrease in the 
total tax revenue will be (k-1)[½(a+1)-ε(a-1)].  This completes the proof of Theorem 1.  
 
While this outcome for a proportional change income is quite straightforward, the 
former case of the impact on government revenues for a change in inequality likely 
deserves a bit more attention prior to moving to the empirical model.  To provide some 
additional intuition for this outcome, consider again the regressive tax system in which L-
types pay 60 percent of their pre-tax income in taxes while H-types pay just 40 percent.  
Recall that such a tax system would lead to yL
R = .4 and yL
R = 3a/5 with pre-tax incomes 
of 1 and a for L and H types, respectively.  Suppose a = 4.  Then we will have yL
R = 4/10 
and yL
R = 24/10 yielding a total tax revenue, TTR
R, of (4/10+16/10) = 2.  Now consider 
pre-tax income levels .5 and 4.5 for L and H-types, respectively.  In this case the tax 
system will lead to yL
R = 2/10 and yL
R = 27/10 and to TTR
R = (3/10+18/10) = 21/10 > 2.   9
Of course, showing that an increase in income or income equality leads under 
these circumstances to an increase in government tax revenue, doesn’t in itself prove that 
those increased dollars will be well-spent.  At the outset, we assumed that government 
revenues were used to fund infrastructure projects such as water systems.  This may well 
occur.  At the same time, the additional revenue might, for examples, fund ridiculously 
lavish lifestyles for the ruling elites, be used to provide for patronage hiring, be spent on 
unneeded projects that benefit allies of the ruling class, or, in extreme cases, be simply 
stolen by those in charge, finding its way into foreign bank accounts.  Examples of each 
abound, especially in the relatively less economically developed part of the world that we 
are considering.  What provides a check on such behavior?  One such check is the degree 
of political development that exists within the country.  That is, while certainly not 
ensuring a one-to-one transfer of increased tax revenues into needed infrastructure 
projects in general, and into water systems specifically, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the greater is the ability of a country’s citizens to effectively express their desires 
with respect to policies and leadership, the greater is the likelihood that at least part of the 
increased tax revenues will flow into infrastructure projects like water systems.   
Similarly, appropriate use of tax revenues is likely to be enhanced when the power of a 
country’s executive is subject to effective constraint.  As such, the degree of political 
development within a country becomes an important control for the empirical model that 
follows.  
  
3.  Data and Univariate Empirical Models 
As discussed in the introduction, while minor outbreaks of cholera can and do occur   10
across most of the world, since the illness is primarily a result of poor provision of clean 
water services, regrettably cholera tends to target relatively poor populations.  During the 
period 1990-2002, for example, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, Canada, and numerous other wealthy countries reported no deaths from 
cholera and incidence rates (cases per million persons) of less than 0.01.  Even what 
would best be called solidly middle-income countries (those with per capita GDP’s 
between $4,000 and $10,000 in 1996 U.S., dollars adjusted for purchasing power) with 
the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Poland, and Paraguay as examples, reported no deaths 
from cholera between 1990 and 2002 and, with the exception of Paraguay (0.1) also had 
incidence rates less than .01.  From the opposite perspective, during the 1990-20002 
period, in truly poor countries like Nepal, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Zambia, Uganda, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, each with 1996 per capita GDP’s of less than 
$3,000, incidence rates ranged from 250 to more than 550 persons per million, with as 
many as 35 per million succumbing to the disease.  Another way of looking at this 
situation is simply to note that, much to the detriment of those living in relatively poor 
countries the collective action involved in the creation of high-level water systems is a 
typical outcome of the development process.  To see how the two primary inputs detailed 
in our theoretical model, per capita income and equality, influence this collective action 
and thus cholera, we analyze 1,032 observations on countries that reported an outbreak of 
cholera for at least one year between 1980 and 2002 and which had per capita GDP’s less 
than $4,000 during the year.  These restrictions give us 17 countries to analyze 
empirically arising from the Americas, Africa, and Asia.  Here, we briefly describe each 
of the variables used in our models and, in Table 1, offer descriptive statistics.  For more   11
precise definitions and sources, refer to Appendix 1. 
We measure income as a country’s GDP per capita (GDPPC), based on 
purchasing power parity, as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
GDPPC for the entire sample has a mean of $1,641 per year with a rather broad range of 
just over $107 to roughly $4,000. 
Income inequality is captured by using a country’s Gini code (GINI) taken from 
the database constructed by Dollar and Kraay (2002) who draw on four sources for their 
data.  The primary source is a significant extension of the often used Deininger and 
Squire (1996) sample known as the UN-WIDER Income Inequality Database.  Added to 
this set are a number of observations that appear in the original Deininger and Squire 
sample, designated as high-quality, but which were omitted in the UN-WIDER sample.  
A third set of observations arising from developing countries comes from Chen and 
Ravallion (2000) and, finally, a fourth source of data in the Dollar and Kraay database 
comes from observations on, primarily, developed countries, offered by Lundberg and 
Squire (2000).  Taken together, the Dollar and Kraay database offers the most 
comprehensive and consistent sample of measures of inequality, to our knowledge, 
available today.  And, perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that this database 
takes into account and adjusts for the prior vagaries in inequality measures due to factors 
like countries using income-based versus expenditure-based measures, gross versus net 
income, and the like.  This is a standard Gini code with the exception that we have 
reversed it in order to ease interpretation and discussion of the models.  Given this, while 
GINI maintains its standard range of zero to100, in percentage terms, rising values 
indicate increases in equality.  For the countries in our sample, the mean value is 55.61,   12
again with a rather broad range of roughly 34 to 77. 
Our measure of collective action reflects the percentage of a country’s population 
that has reasonable access to an adequate amount of improved, clean water (WATER), 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  It should be noted that this 
variable is not available for each year in the sample period, a shortcoming that we address 
by linearly interpolating annual values from the years for which data are available.  That 
is, we assume that the improvement that all countries in the sample experienced in terms 
of the provision of clean water over the time period being considered was linear.  This is 
likely not the case, as water projects are not completed in a linear fashion, however, there 
is neither an alternative source for data on clean water access nor any way to take into 
account any non-linear changes that occur.  Fortunately, however, we are at least certain 
of the positive direction that annual changes are taking, limiting the error that linear 
interpolation creates.  This variable’s mean indicates that the average country in the 
sample provides clean water to about 65 percent of its population.  More importantly, we 
do see rather dramatic differences for this measure of collective action between countries, 
as reflected in its range of about 27 to 100 percent. 
Finally, for cholera, we use two measures; the number of cases when there is an 
outbreak (INCIDENTS) and the number of deaths (DEATHS) resulting from those cases, 
as reported to WHO.  The typical country in our sample reports a mean of roughly 2,433 
cases of cholera which, on average, led to about 73 deaths when these countries 
experienced an outbreak during the period.  Both INCIDENTS and DEATHS have rather 
wide ranges. 
From the theoretical model, we expect to find the percentage of a population with   13
access to improved water to be positively correlated with both GDPPC and GINI.  
Equally important, we anticipate that our measure of collective action (WATER) will be 
strongly and negatively correlated with both INCIDENTS and DEATHS.  In each case, we 
expect these relations to hold even when relevant socio-demographic and institutional 
variables are controlled for.  As a first step in testing these predictions, we evaluate the 
univariate relations between the key variables, as presented in Table 2. 
In Panel 2a., the sample is broken into Less-Poor (GDPPC>$1,360) and Very-
Poor (GDPPC<$1,360) halves, based on the median of GDPPC.  Generally, we do see 
the pattern of relations predicted by the theoretical model.  Specifically, Less-Poor 
countries offer their populations greater access to clean WATER and experience fewer 
DEATHS when there is a cholera outbreak than do Very-Poor countries.  As is noted, 
each of these relations is statistically significant.  In the case of INCIDENTS, no 
difference of statistical or practical importance is found.   
  Panel 2b. breaks the sample based on the median of GINI.  Here we find that the 
average, relatively Income-Equal country (those with GINI values greater than 56.55) 
offers its population greater access to clean water and reports fewer INCIDENTS and 
DEATHS when it experiences a cholera outbreak than is true for the relatively Income-
Unequal countries.  Each of these relations is statistically significant. 
  Finally, in Panel 2c., the sample is divided into halves based on the median of 
WATER, showing the efficacy of this type of collective action.  That is, when there is a 
cholera outbreak in a country with High-Quality WATER (WATER greater than 67.6), 
significantly fewer individuals die from the disease than is true for those in comparatively 
Low-Quality WATER countries, though no significant or practical difference exists for   14
INCIDENTS. 
  Taken together, we view these univariate results as being consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical model.  There is clear evidence suggesting that 1) access to 
improved, clean water is an increasing function of a country’s levels of income and 
income equality, and 2) collective action, in the form of the provision of clean water, is 
effective in mitigating cholera, at least in terms of the number of people who die from the 
illness.  To put these predictions to more rigorous scrutiny, we estimate two basic 
regression models, as detailed below. 
In the first, we correlate GDPPC and GINI with our measure of collective action, 
WATER, the percentage of a country’s population having access to clean water.  As 
control variables in this estimation, we include DEM, GOV, WARS and URBPOP.  
As discussed above, there is no necessary requirement that an increase in tax 
revenues will find its way into socially desirable infrastructure projects like improved 
water systems.  At the same time, this outcome seems more likely the greater is the 
degree of political development or transparency that exists within a country.  As such, we 
include the democracy index (DEM) provided by Polity IV.  This scale, which runs from 
zero to ten, ranks countries annually on three elements of what might be generally called 
good government:  1) the extent to which the public can effectively express their desires 
concerning government policies and leaders, 2) the extent of constraints on the power of 
the executive, and 3) the extent of civil liberties in terms of both their political and non-
political activities.  Higher values on DEM are indicative of more well developed 
governmental institutions and, as such, we expect that it will exert a positive influence on 
the extent of the provision of clean water.  In our sample, DEM has a mean of 2.62 and   15
individual observations cover the entire potential range. 
 GOV and WARS are included as a further proxy for a country’s institutional 
arrangements and for internal stability.  GOV, a country’s general government, final 
consumption expenditure, as a percent of GDP, is taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  The mean value for GOV is 13.58 while it ranges from 3.75 to 
54.52.  While we would prefer to have a measure of a country’s government investment 
spending, such data, to our knowledge, is not available for a broad sample of countries 
over time, and this lack is especially acute in the developing world.  Thus, while not 
ideal, we use final consumption expenditures to give us an idea of the nature of a 
country’s government.  We include this variable because governments tend to play very 
different institutional roles in differing countries.  Those that are, on average, relatively 
benevolent, may take a comparatively large share of national resources and put it to work 
on various, useful collective action projects.  In such countries, there is likely to be a 
generally high level of acceptance of this enlarged footprint of government as it is the 
general public that benefits.  Of course, this is not always the case as, globally, there are 
numerous examples of government’s malevolently using public resources wastefully or 
simply to further their own goals.  In other words, institutions develop differently in 
various countries and these institutions have an impact on a country’s investment in all 
types of collective action.  If the former interpretation is correct, on average,  we expect 
to find GOV  being positively related to WATER indicating that countries where 
government tends to play a larger role, will likely have more well-developed systems for 
providing clean water to their populations while the opposite is expected if the latter 
interpretation is more common.       16
To control for internal instability, we take from the Banks Cross-National Time 
Series Data Archive information relative to para-military activities such as gorilla actions, 
sabotage of infrastructure, and the like.  Our measure of instability, WARS, refers to the 
number of such events during the prior five years.  The mean value for WARS is 1.18 and 
ranges from zero to 13.  Wars and political instability can devastate infrastructure and 
health resources, and lead to the displacement of large parts of a country’s population 
into often squalid, overcrowded refugee camps where illnesses like cholera can spread 
rapidly.  A recent example of this occurred in the Goma camps in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  Given this, the expectation for this variable is obvious:  in such 
cases, water infrastructure is likely to be a prime target for insurgents thus a negative 
relation is expected between WARS and WATER. 
Finally, URBPOP is the share of the total population that lives in an urban area, as 
reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  This variable, with a mean 
of 34.58 and range of 4.34 to 84.38, is included for obvious, practical reasons:  even in 
relatively poor countries, urbanization’s clustering of people drives down the marginal 
cost of providing clean water thus leading us to expect a positive relation between this 
variable and the proportion of a country’s population with access to clean water.   
  Having established the relations between the key variables, WATER, GDPPC, and 
GINI, in the first equation, we turn our attention to the effectiveness of the collective 
action by estimating regressions with, alternately, INCIDENTS  and  DEATHS  as the 
dependent variable.  In each case, we include as independent variables, our measure of 
collective action, WATER, as well as:  GDPPC, GINI, POP, POP14, MORT, LIT, LAT, 
and FLOODS.  WATER and GDPPC are primary measures of development and, as such,   17
omitting GDPPC from the INCIDENTS and DEATHS equations would potentially create 
the possibility of the WATER variable capturing not just the pure effect of that variable on 
INCIDENTS and DEATHS but also the effects of other elements of the development 
process.  By including GDPPC, which is closely related to various aspects of 
development, this variable should point to the effect of those aspects of development, 
other than WATER, that affect INCIDENTS and DEATHS,  We expect GDPPC to exert 
strong negative influences on both INCIDENTS and DEATHS.  
  GINI is included as it seems plausible that as equality increases within a country, 
there might be more uniform access to factors such as whatever given quantity of clean 
water is available, to medical facilities, and to public education as to how to mitigate the 
effects of the disease and, thus expect this variable to be negatively correlated with the 
dependent variables.  We include two measures of a country’s population, each taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, total population (POP), and the 
percentage of that total which is 14 years old or younger (POP14), since the very young 
tend to be especially susceptible to cholera.   In our sample, the typical country has a 
population of about 6.5 million persons with a bit more than 42 percent being 14 or 
younger.  In each case, we expect the variable to be positively associated with each of the 
dependent variables. 
  The next two variables are included as, admittedly, crude proxies for the state of a 
country’s health care and education networks.  Specifically, MORT is the probability that 
a newborn will die prior to reaching age five, per 1,000 live births for a given country 
while LIT is a country’s basic literacy rate, each taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  The mean value for these two variables, respectively, is 86.52   18
and 57.51.  To the extent that more developed health and education systems can serve to 
mitigate the outbreak of cholera, its spread, and its severity, we expect MORT to show a 
positive relation with the dependent variables with the opposite being true for LIT.    
Finally, we include controls for location and climate, LAT and FLOODS. LAT 
measures the absolute distance of a country from the equator, taken from the CIA 
Factbook.  Controlling for LAT, which has a mean of just 14.09 is important because, as 
discussed above, cholera is by nature a tropical disease, thus, LAT should be found to be 
negatively related to both INCIDENTS and DEATHS.  FLOODS, with a mean of 3.16 in 
the prior 5 years, is important as a control since it has the potential to overwhelm basic 
water systems, spreading tainted water throughout a rather large geographic area, such as 
occurred following Hurricane Mitch in Central America in late 1998.  The expectation 
here is positive on both INCIDENTS and DEATHS. 
  
4.  Multivariate Empirical Models 
A.  Correlates of Access to Clean Water 
The theoretical model predicts that collective action, in the form of providing a 
population with access to clean, improved water, is a positive function of a country’s 
income and its degree of income equality.  This contention is supported in the univariate 
models presented above but, to more formally test it, we estimate the following two-way 
fixed-effects model: 
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where  WATER  is the percentage of the population having access to clean water for 
country i in continent s at time t, GDPPC represents per capita income, GINI is a measure 
of income equality, DEM reflects the extent of transparency and public input that exists 
within government operations, GOV represents general government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, WARS indicates the extent of internal strife 
occurring within the country during the previous five years, and URBPOP is the share of 
the total population that resides within an urban area.  
We use year fixed-effects, γt,, to control for any time-specific effects that shift the 
level of clean water access for all continents which might include technological changes 
affecting the creation and extension of water systems, greater international cooperation 
with respect to development of water systems and the like, over the period under review.  
Giving us the second dimension of potential fixed-effects, the γi represent individual 
continents, allowing us to capture any unobserved continent-specific heterogeneity that is 
relatively fixed over time, such as general weather conditions, topography, cultural norms 
and so forth.  Since our interest is on the partial effects of time-varying covariates, fixed-
effects estimation is attractive because it allows any unobserved heterogeneity to be 
freely correlated with the time-varying covariates.  In addition, continent fixed-effects 
permit us to take into account differences across continents in terms of a particular 
continent’s tendency to accurately gather data on the extent of access to clean water and 
to report that information appropriately.  To the extent that the degree of misreporting 
remains constant over time but varies across continents, the fixed-effects procedure will 
leave the estimates of the impact of the explanatory variables on water access   20
unaffected.
4  Given this, Table 3 reports the outcomes when both continental and year 
fixed-effects are controlled, for all those country-year observations in the primary 
sample—those with GDPPC’s less than $4,000—and also, to assess the stability of the 
relations, for two subsets, those with GDPPC’s less than $3,000 and $2,000, respectively. 
The first thing to note about the regressions of Table 3 are the models’ relatively 
good fit, offering reasonably high R-square values and highly significant F-tests 
indicating the likelihood of the included independent variables being jointly equal to zero 
is virtually nil and that the combined fixed-effects are necessary in order to take into 
account continent and year heterogeneity in explaining differing access to improved 
water between the continents and over time, in each model.  Taken together, these tests 
indicate that, indeed, in assessing collective action and its determinants, there is 
information to be had by exploiting the dataset’s panel nature and the preferred way of 
doing so is through the use of the two-way fixed-effects estimator. 
Of primary importance in Table 3 are the results across the samples for the 
income and income equality variables which, in each case, are consistent with both the 
theoretical model’s predictions and the simple, univariate results reported above.   
Regardless of the sample employed, as income (GDPPC) and income equality (GINI) 
increase within a country, access to clean water increases and significantly so, beyond the 
.01 level for each.  As discussed in detail in the theory section, it appears that income and 
income equality, taken together, are very powerful predictors of access to improved 
water.  Importantly, this result holds even when the institutional variable for government 
                                                 
4 To illustrate, when Equation (3) is estimated using fixed-effects, the coefficients reflect within-continent variation in 
access to clean water and its determinants.  Multiplying continent i’s access to clean water by a constant to reflect poor 
or incomplete reporting would not change the estimates of the coefficients. 
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transparency, DEM, is included, which is itself positive and significant (beyond the .01 
level across models).  Apparently, in countries with relatively high levels of political 
development characterized by transparency and real public input into government 
decision-making, the likelihood of growing tax revenues being put to socially good uses, 
such as investments in water systems, increases.   
  The remaining control variables in the estimation of Equation (3) are also well-
behaved across the three samples offering the expected relations with WATER.  
Specifically, we find that as the footprint of government increases within an economy, as 
measured by the percent of GDP accounted for by government expenditures (GOV), 
access to clean water also increases, beyond the .01 level, in all but the case of those 
country-year observations for which GDPPC is less than $2,000 (though the relation is 
positive here as well).  We take this to support the ‘relatively benevolent’ view of 
government discussed above.  That is, in countries where institutions have evolved such 
that there is a comparatively stronger, accepted role played by government in general, 
there is an increased likelihood of all forms of collective action, including the provision 
of improved water.    Again as expected, across samples, we find that the existence of 
domestic conflict (WARS) has a consistently significant and negative impact on the ability 
of a government to provide clean water to its people.  This is particularly reasonable in 
that the variable specifically targets the types of domestic conflict that can be expected to 
result in attacks on public infrastructure.  Finally, for each sample, the percentage of a 
country’s population that has access to improved water is strongly correlated with the 
percentage of that country’s population living in urban areas, URBPOP.  While an 
important control, this likely reflects little more than the ease with which improved water   22
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can be made available to a population when that population is concentrated within a 
localized area rather than being geographically dispersed.   
  Taken together, the results of the estimation of Equation (3) clearly support one of 
our two primary contentions.  That is, with a reasonably high level of confidence, we 
conclude that collective action in the form of the provision of clean water is an increasing 
function of a country’s income and income equality.  To complete the test of our 
theoretical model’s predictions, we turn to the question of how effective this collective 
action is in mitigating cholera. 
 
B.  Correlates of Cholera Incidents and Deaths  
To consider the effectiveness of collective action in mitigating cholera, we 
estimate the following two-way fixed-effects model: 
 
                                         
where CHOLERAist  represents, alternately, the number of INCIDENTS or the number of 
DEATHS from cholera for country i in continent s at time t, WATER is the percentage of 
the population having access to clean water, MORT is the probability of a newborn 
failing to reach age five, per 1,000 live births, LIT indicates the percentage of the 
population that has attained basic literacy, GDPPC is per capita GDP, POP is the total 
population of a country, POP14 represents the percentage of the total population that is 
14 years old or younger, LAT measures the absolute distance of a country from the 
equator, FLOODS indicates number of floods occurring within the prior five years, and 
GINI reflects the degree of income equality within a country.   
As with the estimation of Equation (3), estimation of Equation (4) also takes   23
advantage of the panel-nature of the data by utilizing the two-way fixed-effects estimator, 
γi and γt, controlling for both continent and year effects.  In this case, the continent fixed-
effects might control for factors such as social norms, climatic conditions, and public 
sector corruption that limits the effectiveness of any collective action which differ 
between the continents but vary little over time.  Similarly the year fixed-effects might 
capture items like general improvements in the treatment of cholera that have come about 
over time or, as discussed in the introduction, the unexpected general increase in 
waterborne illnesses that have affected all areas in the past 20 years. 
 INCIDENTS and DEATHS are, of course, each non-negative counts of individual 
cases of cholera and the deaths arising from those cases.  As such, the basic, appropriate 
model is the Poisson.  A shortcoming of the Poisson for the current analysis, however, is 
its assumption of equal conditional mean and variance for the dependent variables.  That 
is, to be appropriate in this case, the Poisson requires that the conditional mean of 
INCIDENTS to be equal to its variance and the same for DEATHS.  As such, the Poisson 
is best applied in situations where there is limited variation in the dependent variable.  
This is not the case in the present analysis as can be easily seen in the descriptive 
statistics of Table 1 where the standard deviation of INCIDENTS is about 5.5 times that 
variable’s mean and the standard deviation of DEATHS is 4.5 times its mean.  In such 
circumstances, the use of Poisson to estimate relations typically causes a downward bias 
(and accompanying inflation of t-statistics) in the coefficient’s standard errors.  To 
correct for this type of over-dispersion, we use the Negative Binomial Regression model 
which generalizes the Poisson by expressly relaxing the assumption of equal conditional 
mean and variance through the introduction of a parameter that accounts for any   24
unobserved heterogeneity between observations. 
Finally, prior to discussing the results for the estimation of Equation (4), we 
should explicitly address the possibility, even likelihood, of colinearity in this model 
since we include four variables (WATER, MORT, LIT, and GDPPC), each of which is 
clearly an element of the process of economic development.  Should colinearity exist 
between any or all of these variables, the undesirable outcome would be inflated standard 
errors potentially resulting in insignificant coefficients for some or all of these 
coefficients, when significant relations actually exist.  We view this as a purely empirical 
matter.  That is, should any or all of these coefficients prove to be insignificant a 
suspicion of colinearity will be raised and will have to be addressed.  To the contrary, 
should each of these coefficients prove significant, it may be concluded that their natural 
correlation poses no substantial problem for estimation or interpretation.    
Tables 4-6 report results for the INCIDENTS and DEATHS models for the three 
income-related samples—less than $4,000, $3,000, and $2,000, respectively—which, due 
to their high-degree of consistency, we discuss together.
5  In terms of goodness of fit, in 
each model, the full-model Wald Chi-Square test of joint significance of the included 
independent variables is highly significant, well beyond the .001 level.  Further, it should 
be noted that given that these are Negative Binomial specifications, all variables to be 
entered in natural logs. 
In each model, there is strong evidence supporting our second primary contention 
that both INCIDENTS of and DEATHS from cholera are significantly reduced when 
collective action in the form of the provision of clean, improved water increases within a 
country.  Regardless of the income-determined sample, the coefficient on WATER, the 
                                                 
5 Observations are lost here relative to the models presented in Table 3 due to the literacy variable.   25
percentage of a country’s population with access to clean water, is negative and 
significant, beyond the .05 level in both the INCIDENTS and DEATHS equations. Taken 
together with the results from Table 3, we conclude from this that, working through the 
channel of collective action (that is, improved water), income and income equality play a 
major role in mitigating the potentially disastrous effects of cholera.  Further, it is equally 
important to note the outcomes for MORT, LIT, and GDPPC.  As discussed, the provision 
of clean water is typically an element of economic development.  As such, were it the 
only development-related variable included in these equations, it could be plausibly 
argued that the WATER coefficient was not only picking-up the true impact of access to 
clean water but also the effects of all other omitted development-related variables making 
it extremely difficult to interpret the coefficient on WATER.  While it would be 
impossible to include all ‘other’ development-related variables, the inclusion of MORT 
and LIT allow us to control for two of the most important—access to well-developed 
health care and education systems.  And, in every case, these variables yield the expected, 
highly significant relation with both INCIDENTS and DEATHS.  Of course, there may 
well be elements of development which impact cholera and its severity beyond the 
provision of clean water and health and education systems.  In an attempt to control for 
these, in an ‘all else’ approach, we include GDPPC.  That is, the GDPPC coefficient 
should reflect the marginal impact, if any, on cholera and is severity for all other 
development-related factors other than the provision of clean water and health and 
education systems.  Interestingly, such other factors are apparently at play in that GDPPC 
bares a negative and significant relation (at least at the .05 level) with both INICIDENTS 
and DEATHS, regardless of the sample employed.     26
Since in Equation (4) we include both access to clean water, indicators of health 
care and education systems, and, as a catch-all for other development-related factors, per 
capita GDP, and find each to be significant in every model, we conclude that 1) the 
provision of clean water is effective in mitigating cholera, independent of the level of 
development within a country and 2) economic development serves to mitigate cholera in 
ways distinct from simply the provision of clean water.  That is, the significant finding 
for WATER is not simply picking up the general and much broader effects of increased 
economic development as might be expected were we not to be independently controlling 
for the other development-related variables in the model.
6 
  The two population-related control variables (POP and POP14) are a bit less 
consistent across the models.  Since the dependent variables are the number of incidents 
and deaths given a cholera outbreak it is not surprising that POP is positive and highly 
significant (beyond the .01 level) in all of the income-related samples.  The results for 
POP14 are less consistent.  Specifically, as would be expected given the susceptibility of 
the young to cholera, POP14 is positive and generally significant in both the less than 
$4,000 and $3,000 groups but unexpectedly turns negative in the less than $2,000 sub-
group (and actually significantly so in the INCIDENTS equation).  There is no obvious 
interpretation for this result though it may have something to do with the fact that, in the 
latter case, we are truly analyzing very poor countries. 
  The two variables included as controls for the tropical nature of cholera, LAT and 
FLOODS each offer the expected signs showing that both INCIDENTS and DEATHS are 
greater, when a country is located closer to the equator and suffers through regular floods, 
                                                 
6 Not surprisingly, however, when the other development-related variables are omitted, WATER remains significant and 
of the same sign in each model but takes on a larger value.   27
though, other than in the full sample, these relations are only regularly significant for the 
LAT coefficient.  Apparently, in very poor countries with very limited access to clean 
water to begin with, flooding poses little marginal risk to populations already at extreme 
risk of contracting cholera. 
  Finally, while we find consistently negative relations between income equality 
(GINI) and each of the dependent variables, as expected, the relations are only significant 
in the full-sample.  It was expected that greater equality might translate into more 
uniform access to whatever clean water might be available, health care, and the like.  As 
with FLOODS we have no intuitive explanation as to why income equality seems to 
matter, but relatively significantly only for the comparatively less poor country-year 
observations in our overall sample. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Cholera and other diarrheal diseases currently account for 11.3 percent of all deaths 
among the poor globally, making such illnesses the second leading cause of deaths 
among the poor.  This statistic is particularly troublesome given that the origins and 
transmission mechanisms of cholera are not just well-understood but nearly completely 
preventable.  Specifically, cholera is an acute intestinal infection which is spread when a 
victim ingests tainted water or food.  As such, cholera can be suppressed rather easily 
through the provision of clean water and use of proper sanitation procedures.  Of course, 
knowing how to suppress cholera is not the same as having the resources or public will to 
do so.   
In this paper, we address these issues by first developing a theoretical model   28
which describes the conditions in which one might expect to find effective collective 
action, in the form of the provision of clean water.  This model shows that collective 
action of this sort is an increasing function of both a country’s level of income and 
income equality.  By extension, our model predicts that the effects of cholera are 
expected to be less severe when an outbreak occurs in a country with relatively high 
levels of income and income equality than would be true where income and/or equality 
are low.  To test these predictions, we analyze a panel of 17 relatively poor countries who 
reported at least one outbreak of cholera during the 23 year period, 1980-2002, given us a 
total of 1,032 observations.   
    Whether we look at the number of cases of cholera or the number of deaths 
resulting from a given outbreak, we find consistently strong results.  That is, there is 
strong support for the contention that income and income equality, working through the 
channel of the provision of clean water, our measure of collective action, are primary 
factors in determining the extent to which the outbreak devastates a country and that this 
positive effect of the provision of clean water is independent of any other development-
related factors that likely also serve to mitigate the ravages of cholera, such as better 
education about disease transmission, expanded medical access, and the like.   
Interestingly, and remarkable, a practical example of these relations is offered, at a local 
level by Bradshaw et al. (1997, p. 225): “In the 1930s and 1940s the Mexican population 
of San Antonio… inhabited some of the worst slums in the USA.  … The postneonatal 
diarrhea mortality rate (risk) was 48 per 1,000 Mexican origin infants, but only 7 per 
1,000 Anglo infants.  …[M]iserable living conditions without proper water supplies and 
sanitation in the densely settled Mexican American neighborhoods gave rise to … high   29
diarrhea morbidity and mortality.  …By 1970 this cause of death virtually disappeared in 
both populations.  …[R]eduction of mortality from diarrhea was a consequence of 
specific community interventions.” 
As such, policies designed to increase economic growth and to improve the 
distribution of income resulting from that growth will likely serve to limit the impact that 
cholera has on a country.  Of course, it is much easier to suggest improvements in 
economic growth and the distribution of income, especially in the developing world, than 
it is to actually develop policies that will bring these goals about.  However, as the 
analysis in this paper shows, such policies are likely to have positive affects that are not 
immediately apparent if one simply focuses narrowly on economic measures of 
performance resulting from government actions.












                                                 
7 Cutler and Miller (2004) report that in major U.S. cities during the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries clean water was 
responsible for almost half of the total mortality reduction, three-quarters of the infant mortality reduction, and about 
two-thirds of the child mortality reduction, and that the social rate of return to clean water technologies was greater 
than 23 to 1. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean St.  Deviation Minimum  Maximum
INCIDENTS  2,432.89 13,339.27  0.00  322,562 
DEATHS  73.18 324.36  0.00  7,654 
WATER  65.37 17.85  26.94  100 
GDPPC  1,640.79 1,017.63  107.49  3,999.01 
GINI  55.61 9.82  33.80 77.0 
DEM   2.62 3.25  0.00  10.00 
GOV  13.58 6.45  3.75 54.52 
URBPOP  34.58 17.91  4.34  84.38 
POP  6,540,000 20,200,000  300,000 126,000,000 
POP14  42.47 4.86  57.45  57.46 
LAT  14.09 8.51  1.00 35.00 
FLOODS    3.16 4.59  0.00  26.00 
WARS  1.18 2.09  0.00  13.00 
MORT  86.52 41.19  15.90  192.00 
LIT  57.51 23.76  7.94  98.37 
 

















Table2. Relations between Incidents, Deaths, Water, GDP per capita, and Gini 
 
Panel 2a. GDP per capita, Water, Incidents, and Deaths 
 
Variable GDPPC<1,360 









Water  55.24 14.09 75.46 15.30  -20.22** 
       (22.07) 
 
Incidents  2,432.04  6,575.42 2,429.75 17,676.52            6.28 
         (0.01) 
 
Deaths               114.76  429.15 31.77 152.71   82.98** 
         (4.14) 
 
 












Water  63.43  16.13 67.20 19.18     - 3.76** 
( 3.40) 
 
Incidents  3,239.37 18,337.69   1,666.04 5,150.46  1,573.33  * 
     (1.89) 
 
Deaths   98.52  431.21 49.09 165.71  49.42** 
     (2.45) 
 
 
Panel 2c. Water, Deaths, and Incidents 
 
Variable WATER<67.60 
               Mean 
WATER<67.60
          Std. Dev. 
WATER>67.60
               Mean 
WATER>67.60 
          Std. Dev. 
Difference
     t-test
Incidents  2,361.33   6,600.61 2,503.38   142.17   -142.02  
       (0.86) 
Deaths  114.32   19.00 32.68  6.75   81.63** 
    (4.07) 
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Table 3. Correlates of Access to Clean Water, by Income Level   






















GDPPC   
 
 0.005** 
    (0.0005) 
 
0.007** 
      (0.0008) 
 
0.004** 





    (0.0422) 
 
0.147** 
      (0.0456) 
 
0.228** 
      (0.0498) 
 
DEM   
 
0.405** 
    (0.1365) 
 
0.564** 
       (0.1571) 
 






    (0.0652) 
 
 0.143**          
(0.0734) 
 
       0.013 






    (0.1880) 
 
      -0.715** 









    (0.0310) 
 
       0.360** 
      (0.0373) 
 
0.455** 













R-Square    0.37            0.32 






     94.20** 
 
 
              69.62** 
 
          63.97** 
 
F-test
b        21.03**  14.09**
 





   
1,032 
              
 904 
        
  712 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significance at 5% level, and ** denotes  
significance at 1% level.
  a Test of the significance of the independent variables.
  b Test of the  
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POP   
 
0.389** 
            (0.0513) 
 













           -0.311** 







            0.185** 
           (0.0928) 
 
  0.1961** 




           -0.498* 
           (0.2607) 
 
           -0.483* 
           (0.2717) 
 
Estimation Procedure  Negative Binomial 
Two-Way Fixed Effects 
 
Negative Binomial 














  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significance at 5% level, and ** denotes  
  significance at 1% level. 
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     Table 5.  Correlates of Incidents and Deaths:  GDPPC Less than $3,000  
 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significance at 5% level, and ** denotes  
  significance at 1% level. 
 


















            -0.407* 



























POP   
 
























              0.139 
 (0.1001) 
 
             0.175* 




             -0.298 
 (0.1215) 
 




Estimation Procedure  Negative Binomial 
Two-Way Fixed Effects 
 
Negative Binomial 










Number of Observations   856 
 
856 
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       Table 6.  Correlates of Incidents and Deaths:  GDPPC Less than $2,000  
 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significance at 5% level, and ** denotes  
  significance at 1% level. 
 








   (3.9317) 
 
-5.260 




   -0.751** 
  (0.2364) 
 
  -0.703** 





   1.809** 
  (0.3305) 
 
   1.808** 





  -0.857** 
 (0.1835) 
 








           -0.242* 
(0.1411) 
 
POP   
 








           -2.091* 
 (1.2555) 
 
           -1.025 











          
           0.071 
          (0.1151) 
 
            0.078 





   (0.2949) 
 
-0.027 
  (0.3059) 
 
 


























VARIABLE DEFINITION  SOURCE 
WATER  The percentage of the population with 
reasonable access to an adequate amount of 
water from an improved source.  
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 
DEATHS  Total number of deaths due to cholera 
reported to the WHO, as provided directly. 
World Health Organization 
INCIDENTS  Number of cases of cholera reported to the 
WHO, as provided directly. 
World Health Organization 
GDPPC  GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP). 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 
GINI  An aggregate numerical measure of income 
inequality, reversed, ranging from 0 (perfect 
inequality) to 100 (perfect equality).  
Deininger and Squire Dataset 
(1996) 
 
DEM  An eleven category scale, from 0 to 10, with 
a higher score indicating greater democracy. 
Polity IV database 
URBPOP  The share of the total population living in 
areas defined as urban. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 
GOV  General government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 
POP14  The percentage of the total population that 
is in the age group 0 to 14. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 
POP  The de facto total of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status 
or citizenship. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 




FLOODS  Number of floods per year.  EMDAT. OFDA/CRED 
International Disaster Database. 
WARS  Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings 
carried on by independent bands of citizens 
or irregular forces and aimed at the 
overthrow of the present regime.  
Banks Cross-National Time 
Series Data Archive 
MORT  Probability that a newborn baby will die 
before reaching age five, if subject to 
current age-specific mortality rates. The 
probability is expressed as a rate per 1,000. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004 
LIT  Percentage of population ages 15 and above 
who can read and write. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2004. 
 
 
 
 